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Numerous challenges coalesce to make southern Africa emblematic of the connections between climate and the water–energy–food nexus, which has important economic 
influence throughout the region. Physical and socioeconomic expo-
sure to climate is high in socioeconomically vulnerable areas and 
crucial sectors, such as agriculture, but also in energy generation 
and mining. For example, almost 100% of electricity production in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Malawi and 
Zambia is from hydropower. Hydropower further comprises a major 
component of regional energy security through extensive sharing 
as part of the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP). The region’s 
population is concentrated in areas exposed to high levels of hydro-
meteorological variability1 and is projected to roughly double by 
20502. Of the 13 mainland countries and Madagascar (Table 1) that 
comprise the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 
six are defined as low income, three as lower-middle income and 
four as upper-middle income, according to the World Bank clas-
sification (using 2012 gross national income per capita). There are 
few quantified examples of the links between climate and economic 
activity in the region, although South Africa experienced a decrease 
in gross domestic product (GDP) in the 1983  El Niño year3, and 
economic modelling studies in Malawi and Zambia indicate that 
the severe 1992 drought caused a drop in GDP of approximately 
7–9% and adversely affected household poverty4. Climate variabil-
ity has important consequences for resource management in the 
region, including for non-equilibrium production systems such as 
rangeland ecology5, irrigation6 and lakes7. Southern Africa is also a 
region where seasonal climate forecasts can potentially benefit areas 
where sustained forecast skill is demonstrated. Seasonal climate 
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In southern Africa, the connections between climate and the water–energy–food nexus are strong. Physical and socioeconomic 
exposure to climate is high in many areas and in crucial economic sectors. Spatial interdependence is also high, driven, for 
example, by the regional extent of many climate anomalies and river basins and aquifers that span national boundaries. There is 
now strong evidence of the effects of individual climate anomalies, but associations between national rainfall and gross domes-
tic product and crop production remain relatively weak. The majority of climate models project decreases in annual precipita-
tion for southern Africa, typically by as much as 20% by the 2080s. Impact models suggest these changes would propagate 
into reduced water availability and crop yields. Recognition of spatial and sectoral interdependencies should inform policies, 
institutions and investments for enhancing water, energy and food security. Three key political and economic instruments could 
be strengthened for this purpose: the Southern African Development Community, the Southern African Power Pool and trade of 
agricultural products amounting to significant transfers of embedded water.
forecasting has been the subject of many studies in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA)8,9 and the Southern Africa Regional Climate Outlook 
Forum provides advance information about the likely character of 
seasonal climate. Yet, despite more than a decade of research on 
hydrological applications of seasonal forecasts, there is limited evi-
dence of their operational use in the water sector9. With ongoing 
climate change, annual precipitation, soil moisture and runoff are 
likely to decrease, while rising temperatures could increase evapora-
tive demand in large parts of the region10 (Fig. 1).
The past decade saw rapid growth in research and policy interest 
in natural resource scarcity, with water–energy–food interdepend-
encies increasingly framed as a nexus, or resource trilemma. The 
Bonn nexus conference in 201111 is notable in this process of recog-
nizing the complex interactions between sectors and resource sys-
tems, and the need to minimize the trade-offs and risks of adverse 
cross-sectoral impacts11,12. The nexus is increasingly prominent on 
policymakers’ agendas, partly in relation to the post-2015 agenda for 
the sustainable development goals13. The private sector was another 
early promoter of the nexus concept14 owing to growing associated 
risks affecting production security along supply chains, such as (but 
not exclusively) for water15. In southern Africa, for example, South 
African brewers SABMiller are seeking better approaches to han-
dling trade-offs between water, energy and food by attempting to 
make business decisions through a resource nexus lens16. Strong 
interdependencies on a range of scales give rise to a large number of 
trade-offs and co-benefits, according to the heterogeneous configu-
rations of societal uses of water across river basins and aquifers. The 
region’s many transboundary basins require actions among upstream 
and downstream water uses to be reconciled between countries.
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Previous nexus studies have concentrated on global 
interdependencies17, problem framing18 or case studies of specific 
systems such as islands19 and irrigation and hydropower produc-
tion20. Here, we examine southern Africa’s nexus from the per-
spective of climate and modify Hoff ’s nexus framework11, which 
integrates global trends (drivers) with fields of action, to highlight 
the role of climate as a driver (Fig. 2). Climate encompasses aver-
age (that is, 30-yr) conditions, variability over years to decades 
(that is, as observed) and anthropogenic climate change. In terms 
of the nexus, we consider the main elements of intraregional links 
in water–energy–food at a national level, while highlighting con-
nections on the river basin scale and drawing attention to case stud-
ies of the many examples of specific trade-offs and synergies21. We 
base our review on published studies, complemented by empirical 
analysis of available national-level data on climate, water resources, 
crop production, trade and GDP. We first consider national-level 
exposure of water, energy and food production to climate variability 
in aggregate economic terms and analyse the relationship between 
interannual and multiyear climate variability and economic activ-
ity, focusing on GDP and agricultural production. We then outline 
the potential for seasonal climate forecasting in areas with high 
forecasting skill and socially and economically important nexus-
related activities, and summarize studies that model the impact of 
anthropogenic climate change on elements of the nexus. Finally, we 
describe three key intraregional mechanisms for balancing nexus 
components, and conclude by identifying knowledge gaps in south-
ern Africa’s climate and water–energy–food nexus.
National-level exposure of nexus sectors to climate
We characterize exposure as the interaction between characteristics 
of the climate system (particularly interannual rainfall variability) 
and a country’s dependence on climate-sensitive economic activities 
such as the share of agriculture in GDP, the proportion of rainfed 
agricultural land and the energy contribution from hydroelectric 
sources (Table 1; Fig. 3). South Africa’s GDP is larger than that of 
the other 12 southern African economies combined. The direct con-
tribution of agriculture to the economy is lowest (<10%) in South 
Africa, Botswana, Swaziland, Namibia, Angola and Lesotho, 13% in 
Zimbabwe and more than 20% in the other countries. If agricultural 
processing were included in agricultural GDP, the shares would be 
substantially larger in most, if not all, SADC countries. The share of 
cropland equipped for irrigation is low in most of the region, with 
the exception of Madagascar, South Africa and Swaziland (Table 1). 
The contribution of hydropower to energy production is very high 
overall (Fig.  3), but varies considerably across the region, from 
1.5% in South Africa to more than 30% in Madagascar, Swaziland 
and Zimbabwe, and to almost 100% in DRC, Lesotho, Malawi and 
Zambia. Reliable electricity production is at risk during prolonged 
droughts and also during extreme flood events, when dam safety 
is an additional risk. More than 90% of South Africa’s energy gen-
eration is coal-based22, well above the rest of the region. Coal-fired 
power plants with wet cooling systems consume far more water 
than most other energy technologies22. Thus, South Africa’s main 
energy utility, Eskom, uses about 2% of the country’s freshwater 
resources, mainly for coal-fired power stations23. Coal mining and 
energy generation from coal both substantially impact water quality 
and availability24. To reduce these impacts, Eskom has implemented 
a dry-cooling system in two existing and all new power stations25, 
enabling a 15-fold reduction in water use.
Overall, there are strong contrasts (Table  1) in energy (8–84% 
of energy consumption imported) and food (5–90% of cereal food 
imported) self-sufficiency, and in the intensity of freshwater use, 
expressed as freshwater withdrawals relative to total actual renew-
able water resources (TARWR; 0.1–24%). Countries facing most 
water shortage, expressed as share of TARWR withdrawn (Table 1), 
are South Africa (24%), Swaziland (23%) and Zimbabwe (21%), 
well within categories defined as physically water scarce (ratio 
larger than 20%26). We interpret this indicator with caution, noting 
its failure to capture the complex spatial and temporal distribution 
of water, political economic access, differences in water needs and 
socioeconomic capacity to support effective water utilization27,28. 
Subnational areas of high demand relative to availability include 
southern Malawi, Namibia and Botswana. Low ratios of water with-
drawal to TARWR (such as 0.05% in DRC28) could also indicate eco-
nomic water scarcity owing to inadequate investments to harness 
and deliver water.
The cereal import dependency ratio (Table 1) reflects the impor-
tance of imports for the volume of grains available for consump-
tion in the country (that is, production + imports − exports). It is 
particularly high for the small countries of Swaziland and Lesotho, 
and more strikingly so for larger nations such as Botswana (90%), 
Namibia (65%) and Angola (55%). Dependency ratios are low-
est in Zambia and Malawi. Total food aid received by the region 
(260,000 tons in 2012; Supplementary Fig. 1) was equivalent to 
Table 1 | Economic indicators and climate-sensitive economic activities across water, energy and food. 
Country GDP (current 
US$ billion)
GDP per capita 
(current US$)
Energy imports 
(% consumption)
Freshwater withdrawal 
(% TARWR)
Cereal import 
dependency ratio (%)
Area equipped for irrigation 
(% cultivated land)
Angola 115 5,540 32 0.48 55 2
Botswana 14.5 7,250 63 1.6 90 1
DRC 18 420 5 0.05 37 0.1
Lesotho 2.3 1,130 – 1.4 85 1
Madagascar 10 440 – 4.9 10 31
Malawi 4.2 270 – 7.9 6 2
Mozambique 14.4 570 21 0.4 31 3
Namibia 13.4 5,930 84 1.6 65 1
South Africa 382 7,310 46 24 19 13
Swaziland 4.1 3,290 – 23 79 26
Tanzania 28 610 13 5.4 13 2
Zambia 20.6 1,460 14 1.5 5 6
Zimbabwe 12.5 910 10 21 52 5
Sources: GDP (2012)90; energy (2012)91; water use (2000–2005)72,92; food trade (2007–2009)93; and irrigation (1960–2005)72,92. 
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about 2–3% of food imported by the region from the rest of the 
world (9 million tons in 2008). Thus, chronic and episodic food 
insecurity remain important problems in the region. The causes are 
numerous and, at the household and individual level, are dominated 
by poverty, environmental stressors and conflict, often underpinned 
by structural elements in the lives of communities, intensified by 
sudden shocks that can be climate related such as decrease in cereal 
availability and food price spikes29,30. 
Climate signals in nexus sectors
Multiyear rainfall variability in southern Africa is higher than in 
many other parts of the world31,32. Interannual variability, expressed as 
the coefficient of variation (COV), is not particularly high on national 
scales: <20% for most countries, except for Botswana and Namibia, 
the driest two countries (Fig. 3). However, rainfall shows much greater 
local variability (local COV exceeds 20% across much of the SADC 
region), strong seasonality and a range of multi-annual to decadal 
variations33. At the national level, long-term trends in rainfall between 
1901 and 2012 are modest (the linear trend is insignificant relative to 
the long-term average), without evidence of any clear spatial pattern 
(Supplementary Table 1). Linear trends during the past two decades 
show varied behaviour; three countries with wetting trends above 
20% of the long-term mean annual rainfall (Botswana, Namibia and 
Zambia) and Tanzania with a drying trend of 21% (Supplementary 
Table 1). National-level analysis is likely to obscure local trends and 
the results are highly sensitive to the period chosen for analysis, par-
ticularly in regions with strong multi-annual variability.
National variations in rainfall and temperature have been found 
to exert major influence on agricultural production in all of SSA, 
but with considerable regional heterogeneity in the response to 
rainfall34. Another study for SSA used panel regressions to explore 
the effects of temperature and precipitation variability on country-
level economic growth indicators, and found drought was the most 
significant climate influence on GDP per capita growth35. We use 
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Figure 1 | Average annual total precipitation (1961–1990) and multimodel ensembles of projected changes in national average annual precipitation 
(as a fraction of 1961–1990 mean) and national average annual mean temperature (°C change from 1961–1990 mean). Estimates are for global warming 
of 2 °C using a pattern-scaling approach (T. J. Osborn, C. J. Wallace, I. C. Harris and T. M. Melvin, manuscript in preparation). The three ensembles are 
CMIP3 (21 models: open coloured symbols and pink shaded distribution), CMIP5 (20 models: filled coloured symbols and brown shaded distribution) and 
Quantifying Uncertainty in Model Predictions (QUMP) (17 versions of the Hadley Centre Coupled Model Version 3 (HadCM3) with perturbed physical 
parameter values: black symbols and blue shaded distribution). The shaded distributions are fit to the data to represent the bivariate ±2 standard deviation 
ranges and have been included to facilitate comparison of the model ensembles rather than to represent probabilistic projections of climate. Black dots 
and black fitted distributions illustrate the ranges of internal variability of 30-yr mean climate simulated in a 1,000-yr control simulation of HadCM3, for 
comparison with the projected changes in climate.
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correlation analysis to explore, for each country, the associations 
between annual rainfall and national economic activity (GDP 
annual growth rate) and agricultural production (all cereals and 
maize — the most significant crop in the region). Fifteen-year slid-
ing correlations are used to examine the temporal stability of asso-
ciations between variables (see Supplementary Information). There 
are no statistically significant relationships between annual rainfall 
and GDP growth rate (Supplementary Table 2). Correlation of rain-
fall with total production of cereals and maize shows three countries 
with significant relationships at the 1% level and three at the 5% level 
(although for DRC it is negative and possibly spurious). The average 
sliding correlations are somewhat higher (Supplementary Table 3).
Time series data of hydropower production are neither publically 
available nor easily comparable between sites/countries, making it 
difficult to assess the importance of climate variability as a driver 
of energy production fluctuations. A study of the effects of modi-
fied reservoir operation on downstream environmental flows of the 
Zambezi shows considerable variability in observed hydropower 
production at three sites, but does not consider the role of climate36. 
Electricity insecurity is known to negatively affect total factor pro-
ductivity and labour productivity of small and medium-sized enter-
prises, but the relationship is not simple, with differences between 
countries and measurement effects37. Studies of specific events 
highlight the major consequences of drought-induced reductions in 
electricity production38. Ref. 18 cites examples of drought impact on 
the Kariba Dam (Zambezi Basin) during 1991–1992, resulting in 
estimated reductions of US$102 million in GDP and US$36 million 
in export earnings; and Kenya, where, during 2000, a 25% reduction 
in hydropower capacity resulted in an estimated 1.5% reduction 
in GDP. A review of the economics of climate change in Tanzania 
profiled the consequences of the 2003 drought, which brought the 
Mtera Dam reservoir levels close to the minimum required for elec-
tricity generation39. This prompted the  Tanzania Electric Supply 
Company to approach a private provider to use gas turbine units at 
huge cost. A more recent World Bank estimate put costs of power 
shortages in Tanzania at US$1.7 million per day, with an average 
63 days per year with power outages39.
Early warnings from the climate system
Given the links between climate and the water–energy–food nexus 
in the region, seasonal forecast information can play an important 
role in guiding nexus-related decision making, depending on fore-
cast skill and utility. Seasonal to interannual variability in southern 
Africa is high, but so is its predictability relative to other regions, 
depending on location, time of year40 and phase of the El Niño–
Southern Oscillation41 (ENSO). This can be seen by considering the 
association (Fig. 4a) between NINO3.4 sea surface temperatures — 
as a representation of ENSO — and gridded rainfall over southern 
Africa south of 15°  S (ref. 41). A state-of-the-art coupled ocean–
atmosphere model has some skill in predicting seasonal (December 
to February, DJF) rainfall over the region at a one-month lead time 
(DJF forecasts produced in November; Fig. 4b shows areas with sta-
tistically significant correlation41; see Supplementary Information). 
Stronger ENSO associations and the best model performance are 
found for maximum temperatures (Supplementary Fig. 2). The 
areas where ENSO impacts significantly and where forecast skill 
levels are relatively high include the river basins of the Limpopo, 
Orange, Umgeni and lower Zambezi.
The Limpopo Basin is particularly notable as having both high 
economic productivity and strong ENSO associations and forecast 
skill. Comprising 408,800 km2, and including the countries of South 
Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, the Limpopo Basin 
is one of the most water stressed in SSA, and features some of the 
largest urban conglomerations (including Pretoria, Johannesburg, 
Gaborone, Francistown and Bulawayo). Irrigation comprises more 
than 50% of basin water use and other infrastructure (including 
industry and mining) is also highly dependent on basin water. 
There are significant mining activities in the basin — particularly 
in South Africa and Zimbabwe42 — that generate major water pol-
lution downstream43. The Limpopo is heavily regulated, with exten-
sive plans for further development.
Despite forecast skill and potential utility in economic produc-
tivity hotspots such as the Limpopo Basin, a comprehensive review 
of seasonal forecasting status in SSA identified persistent barriers 
in realizing the benefits of forecast products, which were generally 
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Figure 2 | Modified version of the nexus framework of Hoff11 integrating global drivers with fields of action, to illustrate the main timescales of climate 
as a driver in southern Africa. SADC, Southern African Development Community; SAPP, Southern African Power Pool.
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insufficient to inform response actions, such as production decisions 
and institutional actions44. If these barriers can be overcome, sea-
sonal forecasting has the potential to contribute to anticipating fluc-
tuations in nexus sectors and could inform guidance on reservoir 
multi-use, water allocation, early targeting of or access to agricul-
tural inputs and credit, design of interventions during food crises, 
and improvements to trade and agricultural insurance45. 
Modelling nexus sectors in a changing climate
The challenges for the water–energy–food nexus posed by interan-
nual variability occur in the context of a gradually changing climate. 
Even if an international agreement to limit global warming to 2 °C 
above pre-industrial conditions is successfully developed, climate 
models project significant changes that exceed the range of natu-
ral climate variability (Fig. 1). According to the majority of climate 
models, most southern African countries will warm more than the 
global mean, with annual mean temperatures rising by 2 to 3 °C in 
most cases. Precipitation changes are more uncertain, with both 
increases and decreases possible. Nevertheless, for most countries 
the majority of models project decreases in annual precipitation, 
by 20% or more for some models and countries. Except for the 
southernmost countries, there is a tendency for models that pro-
ject most warming to simulate stronger reductions in precipitation. 
Analysis of extreme precipitation in the climate models used for the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment 
Report shows a marked delay in rainy season onset over most of the 
region and an early end to the season in parts of the region46.
Most nexus studies for southern Africa have been motivated by 
climate change and assess biophysical impacts for specific sectors, 
for example, rainfall and irrigation water availability on crop pro-
duction, or river flow changes on hydropower generation. Some crop 
models simulate sizable yield losses for southern Africa47, suggesting 
that the region’s food system could be particularly vulnerable to 
climate change48. However, differences in climate scenarios, impact 
models, spatial and temporal scales, and processes represented 
restrict our ability to reliably define impacts for specific sectors 
and, importantly, secondary effects across the water–energy–food 
nexus. Nevertheless, an estimate of the range of potential impacts 
on maize yield (and the wide uncertainty range) can be determined 
from the 30-member ensemble of global gridded crop models run 
by the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project49 (see 
Supplementary Information). The simulated maize yield averaged 
across southern Africa decreases by 15.7 ± 16.3% (rain fed) and 
8.3 ± 20.4% (irrigated) by the 2080s relative to the 2000s, that is, 
a median yield reduction with a substantial range of different out-
comes. The wide range is owing to uncertainties in climate and in 
our understanding of crop response to climate change, particularly 
the role of increased atmospheric CO2 concentration on photosyn-
thesis. In the top five southern African producers, median impacts 
are relatively small in the 2020s and 2050s, becoming more substan-
tially negative by the 2080s, with a stronger level of agreement in the 
sign of change among simulations (Fig. 5). Among these countries, 
rainfed cultivation is most negatively impacted, highlighting that 
water stress is an important limiting factor of crop yield in the region. 
Average crop water use decreases, resulting in a 5.9 ± 20.7% increase 
in estimated crop water productivity (Supplementary Information; 
Supplementary Fig. S3) by the 2080s.
An ensemble of global hydrological models driven by five cli-
mate scenarios from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 
Phase 5 (CMIP5) shows reductions in annual discharge from 0 to 
50% for the multimodel mean across much of southern Africa, 
excluding southwest Botswana50. River basin and water manage-
ment models indicate higher risks for Zambezi hydropower gen-
eration51, while regional and global water and food models suggest 
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lower runoff raises risks for water and food security in southern 
Africa in general52.
The economic dimensions of the nexus in southern Africa can be 
studied using general equilibrium models that translate biophysical 
impacts into economic outcomes. This approach simulates economies 
as adapting to shocks, albeit imperfectly, through market and resource 
adjustments. Incorporating economic adaptation generally leads to 
smaller impacts than those from biophysical studies. As global mod-
els rarely separate southern Africa from SSA, country-level studies are 
the region’s main evidence base. Historical climate variability imposes 
high costs on low-income agrarian economies53 and climate change is 
likely to have adverse effects on food security54. Long-term changes 
in annual precipitation and temperature may have less impact than 
historical variability until 20504,55. Historical data show substantial 
variability in smallholder farm yields and incomes. Increased future 
variability of smallholder farm yields from climate change is therefore 
likely to increase the livelihood and food insecurity risks for farmers 
who are already at high risk54. Although most studies focus on agri-
culture, this is not always the main climate impact channel. For exam-
ple, nexus studies find that road damages from flooding and weather 
stress are equally or more important drivers of the economic losses 
associated with climate change in Mozambique and South Africa56. 
More integrated multisector/country-level studies are needed to 
guide adaptation responses.
A second strand of economic research focuses on climate and 
energy policy. A high proportion of SADC greenhouse gas emissions 
are from South Africa due especially to its reliance on coal-fired power. 
Curbing these emissions may reduce national income and employ-
ment, because financing domestic renewable options requires higher 
electricity tariffs57,58. Lifting South Africa’s restrictions on hydro-
power imports would reduce investment costs and economic losses59. 
Climate change will have considerable indirect impacts on electricity 
generation with positive feedbacks. Higher water and air tempera-
tures make cooling processes in coal-fired power plants less effective 
and potentially reduce water availability during longer dry periods24; 
this could result in an overall reduction of power plant efficiency and 
higher carbon emissions. In its climate change strategy, Eskom aspires 
to diversify its energy generation mix to lower-carbon-emitting tech-
nologies60. Solar photovoltaic and wind energy are considered to be 
the most viable renewable options in terms of water withdrawal and 
consumption compared with biofuel and hydropower25. Biofuels may 
reduce the region’s imported fossil fuels and rural poverty, but have 
potential food security trade-offs61. The research indicates that con-
tinued climate change, economic development and urbanization will 
strengthen interdependencies in the water, energy and food nexus in 
southern Africa and that climate and associated energy policy will 
further reinforce the costs of trade-offs and complementarities across 
the nexus, especially if expansionist regional hydropower and biofuel 
strategies are adopted.
Intraregional instruments for the nexus
Southern Africa can be characterized as a single economic block of 
strongly interlinked economies where water, energy and food flow 
between producers and consumers, which also displays considerable 
heterogeneity in its natural resource endowments and infrastructure 
distribution, sociopolitical cohesion and economic development. 
For both the region and individual nations, this implies significant 
challenges in attempting to balance supply and demand while main-
taining coherent policies towards integrated management of water–
energy–food resources. The region is well placed to transfer resources 
intraregionally to meet energy and food shortfalls. However, rising 
demand for electricity, food and water throughout southern Africa 
may sharpen the region’s sensitivity to climate-induced shocks. 
Fifteen transboundary river basins transect the region, includ-
ing the large Congo and Zambezi basins, shared by nine and eight 
countries, respectively, as well as many smaller shared catchments. 
Surface catchments are underlain by an estimated 16 transboundary 
aquifers62. The origin of the southern African economic block can be 
tied to the dominant position of South Africa and its history along-
side other ex-South African and British colonies such as Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia. South Africa in particu-
lar has great cultural, economic and political influence over its neigh-
bours, making its role as a source (and sometimes a sink) of energy, 
water and food hegemonic63. This alliance and influence is also shown 
through the SAPP (South Africa has 77% of SAPP’s installed power 
supply capacity64), the SADC and other agreements.
In responding to the distribution of and demand for water–
energy–food resources, three key instruments have emerged. First, the 
SADC, based in Botswana, addresses how member countries sharing 
rivers might resolve water allocation priorities through a protocol on 
shared watercourses65,66. The presence of significant water demands 
arising from irrigated agriculture and the Gauteng urban industrial 
complex in South Africa has led to relatively sophisticated water-shar-
ing agreements such as the Joint Development and Utilization of the 
Water Resources of Komati River Basin67 and the Lesotho Highlands 
Development Project. Large-scale dams and interbasin transfers, often 
transboundary, (ref. 68 reports 27 existing ones) form part of national 
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Figure 4 | Rainfall and sea surface temperature; Kendall’s tau 
correlations. a, Between concurrent DJF NINO3.4 sea surface temperatures 
and DJF rainfall for the 30 years from 1982/1983 to 2011/2012. b, Between 
ECHAM4.5-MOM3-DC2 downscaled seasonal rainfall forecasts for 
DJF produced in November and observed DJF rainfall. Data for panel b 
from ref. 41. Correlations significant at the 95% level are shaded. See 
Supplementary Information.
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water–energy–food security strategies. South Africa and Zimbabwe, 
which have the largest numbers of dams, use these predominantly for 
irrigation and water supply, whereas Mozambique, which has one of 
the largest total dam capacities, concentrates on hydropower produc-
tion (Supplementary Table 4). Notwithstanding these institutional 
and physical structures, in some instances water sharing still suffers 
from a lack of integration (particularly between agricultural and water 
institutions) and incomplete efforts to increase stakeholder participa-
tion and decentralize water management (ref.  69, reviewing South 
Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique). Coordination during flood 
events can also be challenging. For example, the persistent 2010–2011 
summer rainfall in the Zambezi Basin resulted in high water levels 
in Lake Kariba. Opening of spillway gates raised downstream water 
levels, which increased flooding and compromised effective reservoir 
management at Cahora Bassa farther downstream in Mozambique70.
Second, the SAPP is a remarkable alliance of 12 energy-gen-
erating bodies from 12 countries interconnected through a grid to 
help smooth spatial and temporal shortfalls in electrical capacity. It 
was established in 1995 by the member governments of the SADC 
(excluding Mauritius) to develop an interconnected electrical sys-
tem, coordinate and enforce common regional standards, harmonize 
relationships, develop expertise across member utilities and promote 
sustainable development71. The SAPP electricity-generating mix in 
2012–2013 was 54,923 MW, comprising a significant proportion from 
hydropower (17.4%), but dominated by coal (72.9%). The network 
is intended to function as a competitive market in which surpluses 
and deficits are resolved via trades and negotiations, and therefore has 
the potential to serve as a buffering mechanism for climate-induced 
river-basin-scale electricity insecurity.
Third, food trade in southern Africa naturally results from regional 
variability in production, especially of maize. Large and efficient 
producers in South Africa induce a trade surplus with other SADC 
members. Importantly, trade of agricultural products corresponds to 
significant transfers of embedded water resources, or ‘virtual water 
trade’ (VWT; see Supplementary Information). Water resources 
embedded in the regional food exports of South Africa and Zambia 
(0.9 and 1.2 km3 in 2011, respectively; Fig. 6a)72 account for two-thirds 
of the total intraregional flow (3.2 km3). The dominant link is from 
Zambia to Zimbabwe, with a volume of 0.8 km3 yr−1 of virtual water, 
followed by Mozambique to Malawi and South Africa to Zimbabwe 
(both 0.5 km3 yr−1). Zimbabwe was the region’s major virtual water 
importer in 2011, importing 2.0 km3 yr−1 from other southern African 
nations. Considering all international food trade, southern Africa is 
largely a net importer of virtual water. Indeed, international imports 
from outside the region (10 million tons of food, or 20.5 km3 of virtual 
water) dominate the VWT flows of southern Africa (27.9 km3 yr−1; 
Fig. 6b). In return, smaller volumes are exported to outside the region 
mainly from South Africa (3.2 km3 yr−1). Most of South African vir-
tual water exports via food are embedded in maize, of which less than 
10% is irrigation (blue) water (0.066 km3). This represents almost all 
of the intraregional blue VWT (0.067 km3)73. This small percentage 
reflects the dominance of rainfed (green water) agriculture in the 
region. Although strong open trade is an important tool to allevi-
ate climate-induced food deficits74,75, and VWT openness tends to 
reduce undernourishment76, southern African countries have vary-
ing levels of trade connectivity and link strengths, both for intra- 
and extra-regional food trade links. Informal border trade plays a 
crucial role in alleviating food shortages. Estimates suggest that 
150,000–250,000 tonnes of maize flow from Mozambique to Malawi 
during years of good production in Mozambique and high demand in 
Malawi77. Informal traders are less encumbered by trade regulations 
than larger formal grain traders, and hence can respond to arbitrage 
opportunities more quickly78. Thus, the potential benefits of food 
trade to alleviate production shocks are likely to be uneven across the 
region, and require further investigation.
One of SADC’s main goals for regional integration is to pro-
mote trade across member countries. Efforts are ongoing to reduce 
major existing barriers, such as trade regulations and lack of reli-
able transportation infrastructure79 — notably via the protocol on 
trade80 — including facilitation of customs processes and a regional 
infrastructure plan for the transport sector81. SADC is currently 
exploring opportunities for greater cross-sectoral coordination in 
the SADC climate change and green economy strategy (under revi-
sion at time of writing82), in which key recommendations focus on 
implementations that will ensure actions do not take place in a sin-
gle directorate. Such recommendations have arguably comprised the 
most demanding area of work for the strategy development, reflect-
ing the importance of ensuring cross-sectoral coordination, as well 
as finding agreement on how to achieve it on the regional scale.
Conclusion and outlook
Climate plays an important role in determining medium-term water 
availability, potential agricultural production and some components 
of energy production and demand. Climate variability drives fluctua-
tions in water–energy–food elements with secondary effects across 
the whole nexus (Fig. 2). Exposure to climate variability and climate 
change are high across nexus sectors that include substantial areas 
of economic activity in southern Africa and there is strong evidence 
of the effects of individual climate events. For example, South Africa 
experienced a 7% drop in GDP in the 1983 El Niño year, and climatic 
fluctuations resulted in GDP variations of up to US$5 billion3. The 
2000 floods in Mozambique led to devastating impacts on livelihoods, 
electricity supplies and basic infrastructure83. Yet our analysis of asso-
ciations between rainfall, GDP and crop production using available 
data shows mostly weak and statistically insignificant correlations in 
contrast to other studies for SSA based on panel regressions34,35. This 
is likely to be partly a function of scale, where national and annual 
scales obscure stronger relationships that may exist at finer levels of 
analysis. Data availability (for example, absence of publically available 
hydropower production time series) and quality also play a role. The 
country climate estimates are often based on sparse station coverage, 
particularly since the 1980s84, and recent scrutiny of GDP data for SSA 
has highlighted a lack of transparency in data sources and collection 
methods, lack of metadata and lack of detail on methods of aggrega-
tion85. This leads to differences between GDP estimates, non-random 
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errors, adjustments to historical data and inhomogeneity in time 
series. National statistical offices are woefully under-resourced in 
SSA, while the need for good-quality data is paramount and urgent, 
to underpin reliable physical and economic modelling and detailed 
narrative of the causal links between climate and nexus sectors86.
River flows in the region are strongly linked to seasonal rainfall 
and temperature variations, and the information reviewed here pro-
vides evidence that seasonal forecasting of river flows in some basins 
has application potential. However, the benefits from seasonal fore-
casting for reducing net food and energy imports through enhanced 
agricultural and hydropower production/energy mix have yet to be 
studied and, even more importantly, implemented in practice. For the 
future, climate models show fairly strong agreement that the southern 
countries in the region may become drier and the secondary impacts, 
although very uncertain, are likely to be substantial across the water–
energy–food nexus.
Water, energy and food are linked across different scales in south-
ern Africa. Spatial interdependence is high and climate anomalies can 
produce regional scale effects, for example, ENSO-related droughts 
and river-basin-scale floods. At the national level, water and energy 
are closely coupled through significant hydropower production in 
several countries. Water use for biofuels and cooling for electricity 
generation remains relatively modest, except for cooling in South 
Africa. In South Africa, policies rarely cross sectoral boundaries of 
water and energy at all governance levels, yet integration of renew-
able technologies for pumping and heating has the potential to benefit 
mitigation and achieve expenditure savings21. Water and food links 
are strong, primarily through green water requirements in rainfed 
agriculture and some hotspots of blue (irrigation) water demand, 
which account for most freshwater consumption in the region. Food 
and energy links are growing due to increasing irrigation, mecha-
nization and fertilization of agriculture, while biofuel development 
remains low. The rapidly increasing demand for energy by industry 
and mining, rapidly growing urban areas and agricultural intensifica-
tion is likely to impose increasing strain on the water–energy–food 
nexus. At the regional level, nexus interdependencies are strong, due 
to multiple shared major river basins and aquifers, the SAPP power-
sharing infrastructure, and intraregional food and embedded water 
trade. These links are enhanced by governance mechanisms such as 
the SADC, which has established protocols on shared water, energy 
and food security, the Southern Africa Regional Climate Outlook 
Forum, and initiatives on trade and the green economy.
Debate is ongoing about whether there is anything new about 
the nexus that distinguishes it from earlier integrative framings87,88. 
Some argue that a nexus framing is better at uncovering more 
effective approaches and methods for cross-sectoral integration by 
examining trade-offs and co-benefits, and through linking disparate 
knowledge sets and improving governance89. However, entrenched 
vertically structured government departments and sector-based 
structures of agencies, policies and regulatory mechanisms com-
plicate coordination, and remain challenges to cross-sectoral inte-
gration87–89. The political economy of governance and operation is 
further challenged by regional and intraregional institutional capac-
ity and power imbalances. Our review suggests that climate change, 
combined with increasing demand associated with wider socioeco-
nomic development pathways, will intensify interdependencies in 
the water–energy–food nexus, particularly shorter-term pressures 
associated with extreme events. We have outlined some of the main 
interdependencies and key regional institutional and policy struc-
tures in southern Africa. There is a need to map these structures on 
finer scales, to understand and share insights into where trends and 
shocks have been managed effectively in the past, and to identify 
measures that enhance successful cross-sectoral approaches. There 
are some efforts in regional strategy and policy formulation to better 
achieve cross-sectoral coordination, but the modalities for attaining 
such coordination are still under debate. In a highly climate-sen-
sitive environment such as southern Africa, emerging strategies — 
such as those under the SADC — will bear fruit only if recognition 
of co-dependencies and inter-relationships in the nexus provides the 
basis for credible and well-monitored actions.
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